Team-specific human capital and performance by Gerrard, Bill & Lockett, Andy
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Gerrard, Bill and Lockett, Andy. (2016) Team-specific human capital and performance. British 
Journal of Management. 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/77078                     
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article Gerrard, Bill and Lockett, Andy. 
(2016) Team-specific human capital and performance. British Journal of Management., 
which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12173 This 
article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and 
Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
  1 
TEAM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill Gerrard 
Leeds University Business School 
University of Leeds 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT, UK 
 
& 
 
Andy Lockett 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  2 
TEAM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE 
Over the last 15 years, scholars of resource-based view (RBV) have highlighted the role of 
human capital (HC) as a key factor explaining why some firms outperform others (Acedo, 
Barroso, & Galan, 2006; Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Coff, 1999). HC 
resources, however, raise a number of challenges for firms wishing to create a position of 
sustainable competitive advantage. First, HC resources may be difficult to protect, as 
individuals have relative freedom to move between rivals (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Second, for 
HC to lead to sustainable performance differences for teams requires the presence of 
isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984), which may include specificity, causal ambiguity, social 
complexity and path dependency (see: Ambrosini & Bowman, 2010; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed & DeFillipi, 1990). By definition, such isolating mechanisms 
protect HC resources from appropriation or imitation, making empirical assessment of their 
importance problematic (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Lockett & 
Thompson, 2001; Rouse & Dellenbach, 1999). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the issues raised above, recent meta-analyses indicate that 
evidence of the resource-performance relationship is less than conclusive (Barney & Arikan, 
2001; Crook, Ketchen, Combs & Todd, 2008; Newbert, 2007) with Newbert’s (2007) meta-
analysis providing specific evidence of the relationship between HC and performance being 
equivocal in nature. We suggest that such equivocality may arise from extant studies 
employing variables that are analytically convenient but are not the most salient ones from a 
HC perspective (See: Lockett, Thompson & Morgensen, 2009, for a RBV perspective), and the 
dominance of cross-sectional study designs that do not allow for resource-accumulation 
processes to play through into performance enhancements. In this paper we address these 
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concerns by focus on the isolating mechanism of the specificity of HC, employing Becker’s 
(1962) distinction between general and specific HC, and utilizing a panel data design.   
Following the lead of Chellemi and Gui (1997) and Huckman and Pisano (2006), we focus 
on the role of team specific HC (henceforth TSHC) in shaping team performance. TSHC 
constitutes the skills and knowledge that individuals develop through interacting with one 
another, and is most valuable when employed in the team context in which it was developed 
(Blair, 1999). As such, TSHC is a particularly interesting resource for RBV scholars because it 
is path dependent in nature, being a unique and valuable skill that is developed over time 
(Coff, 1999; Grant, 1996; Penrose, 1959). Furthermore, in contrast to general human capital, 
TSHC is tied semi-permanently to a team and is thus very difficult to trade or exchange 
without loss of value (Chi, 1994). 
Drawing on the work of Berman et al. (2002) and Huckman, Staats and Upton (2009), who 
differentiate between the different roles individuals may perform in a team, we contribute 
to RBV and HC theory by conceptualizing TSHC as a multi-dimensional concept. Specifically, 
we delineate two dimensions of TSHC, Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC, and 
then develop the following arguments about their interrelationships with team 
performance. First, team members develop Team Member TSHC through their tenure with a 
team, which we argue has a positive effect on team performance. Second, managers 
develop Team Manager TSHC through their tenure with a team, which we suggest positively 
moderates the relationship between Team Member TSHC and team performance. By 
separating out the effects of Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC we are able to 
explore how managerial tenure influences team performance, and how changes in managers 
may reduce the positive performance effects of Team Member TSHC. In doing so, we are 
able to advance scholarship of RBV and HC by examining the conditions under which 
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important firm-specific resources are developed, and with what performance effects. 
Furthermore, we are also able to advance prior research on the relationship between 
managerial tenure and performance that does not account for the quality of HC (see: 
Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi & Guermat, 2010). 
We test our model using a ten-year panel of football organizations competing in the 
English Premier League (EPL). Adopting a panel data approach, we are able to overcome the 
limitations of cross- sectional studies that do not capture the lagged effects of investments 
in HC, or changes in performance over time from a build-up of superior HC. Our approach 
enables us to capture the effects of TSHC as it is developed over time, and/or destroyed, 
through changes to team members and the team manager over time. 
TEAM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE 
A central quest for scholars of the RBV has been to link sustainable performance differences 
to resource endowments (Hatch & Dyer, 2004). A key resource of any organization is HC, 
which we conceptualize employing Becker’s theory of HC (Becker, 1962 & 1975). The HC of 
an individual is determined by their knowledge, skills, and abilities (Schultz, 1961), and may 
be accumulated via work, education and other activities and habits (Becker, 1962; 1975). HC 
may be viewed as consisting of a hierarchy of skills and knowledge with varying degrees of 
transferability across contexts (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Becker (1993) argues that the most 
influential theoretical concept in HC analysis is the distinction between general and specific 
HC. General HC is independent of any context, and can be transferred effectively across 
organizations or teams. Specific HC relates to skills and knowledge that are less transferable 
between contexts, and have a much narrower scope of applicability (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper 
& Woo, 1997).  
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The notion of specific HC has traditionally been related to the firm, and employed by 
economists to examine the remuneration implications of individuals developing either 
general and/or firm specific HC (Addison & Siebert, 1979).  Following the lead of Chillemi and 
Gui (1997), who developed the notion of TSHC as a non-material asset derived from customs 
developed by the individuals in a team, we focus on TSHC and examine its performance 
effects. In doing so we acknowledge that individuals in a team may perform different roles 
(Berman et al., 2002; Huckman et al., 2009) and delineate two different dimensions of TSHC: 
Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC. We expand on these ideas below. 
Team Member TSHC   
Team Member TSHC is developed through the tenure of a team member with a team, 
which may arise in three main ways. First, over time specific training can be implemented 
that will hone the skills of the individual so that they are better suited to their organization. 
Team-specific training will lead to the development of Team Member TSHC, which are the 
skills and knowledge that will have the highest value within their current team (Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, 1978; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Second, over time team members 
will become better able to understand how the organization functions, their role within the 
team, and how to achieve their performance objectives accordingly. Accordingly, team 
member tenure will enhance their Team Member TSHC, enabling team members to act in a 
more coordinated manner (Moreland, Argote & Krishnan, 1998). Third, team member 
tenure will increase their interactions with the “network of workers” in the team (Mailath & 
Postlewaite, 1990). Over time, through shared learning within the team, team members will 
be able to share knowledge about “whom to contact about particular problems that may 
arise and they know the strengths and weaknesses of their co-workers” (Mailath & 
Postlewaite, 1990, p. 369-70). Also, repeated interactions and shared learning about other 
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team members will enhance the levels of trust in team (see: Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997; 
McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003), which will facilitate knowledge flows across team 
members. 
Drawing on Berman et al. (2002), we suggest that an important component of Team 
Member TSHC will be tacit knowledge, which may play an important role in sustaining 
performance advantages for a firm because it is socially complex, and by definition, difficult 
to imitate (Reed & DeFellippi, 1990; Barney, 1991; Nonaka, 1991; Grant, 1996). Hence, Team 
Member TSHC is particularly relevant from a RBV perspective because it is a resource that 
can only be developed over time within a specific team context, which prevents rivals from 
being able to imitate this team-specific resource in the short run (Cappelli & Singh, 1992; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Mahoney, 1995; Penrose, 1959; Prescott & Visscher, 1980; 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). In addition, Team Member TSHC cannot be transferred 
across teams because it is specific to the team context in which it was developed 
(Williamson, 1979; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). We suggest, therefore, that the Team 
Member TSHC holds the potential for teams to generate sustainable performance 
advantages, and will have a positive effect on team performance. Hence: 
 
H1: Team Member TSHC will be positively related to team performance. 
 
Team Manager TSHC 
A number of key authors in the field argue that codified and tacit knowledge are not, and 
should not, be treated as separate entities (see: Polanyi, 1966; Ravetz, 1971; Collins, 1974; 
Gelwick, 1977). Nonaka attests to the close link between both types of knowledge arguing 
that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between codified 
and tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, p. 14). The dichotomy between codified and tacit 
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knowledge, therefore, may be problematic since it is rare that a body of knowledge can be 
completely transformed into a codified form without losing something. As such, most forms 
of knowledge are by definition, a mixture of codified and tacit (Johnson, Lorenz and Lundvall, 
2002). 
We argue that team managers play a key role in imparting codified knowledge to team 
members, and also shaping the way in which team members develop tacit knowledge, in a 
number of different ways. The notion that managers play a key role in shaping the resource-
base of the firm, through the accumulation and deployment firm resources, is central to 
much RBV scholarship (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Augier & Teece, 2008; 2009; Collis & 
Montgomery, 1995; Teece, 2007). A manager’s ability to shape the firm’s resource base to 
enhance performance, however, will depend on their HC. We suggest that as a team 
manager’s tenure increases they will be better able to learn about their organizations, and 
to refine their strategic approach so that it better aligns with their environment (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Henderson et al., 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). An important element of 
learning requires team managers to make effective assessments of team members, and their 
suitability for enacting the team’s desired strategy, which will be revised over time. As a 
consequence, Team Manager TSHC will enhance a team manager’s ability shape the HC of 
their teams, with associated performance benefits, through the accumulation and 
deployment Team Member TSHC. 
In terms of the accumulation of resources, as Team Manager TSHC increases, a team 
manager will be better able to determine the types of individuals they wish to attract, which 
will enable them to better align their organizations to their environment (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Henderson et al., 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). Drawing on the 
“attraction-selection-attrition” model (Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstein & Smith, 1989), 
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as Team Manager TSHC increases they will be better able to shape their team’s HC profile, 
through the mechanisms of “attraction-selection-attrition”, to fit with their strategy for the 
firm.  
In addition to “attraction-selection-attrition”, managers can help develop team members 
TSHC through shaping the training of team members (Chellemi & Gui, 1997; Mailath & 
Postlewaite, 1993; Huckman & Pisano, 2006). Team managers play a key role in fostering a 
learning environment, with high performing teams commonly being explicitly managed to 
promote learning Edmonson, Bohmer and Pisano (2001) of codified and tacit knowledge. As 
a manager’s tenure increases they will be better able to align their organizations to their 
environment (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Henderson et al., 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001), 
of which developing and tailoring training programmes for team members to develop Team 
Member TSHC will be a key component of executing strategy.  
Turning now to the deployment of resources, managers’ deployment of HC may have 
important performance effects, even controlling for the quality of HC involved. We suggest 
that the better informed a manager is about the HC resources at their disposal, the more 
able they will be to deploy the HC resources in an effective manner. As Team Manager TSHC 
increases with tenure, managers will be more informed about the HC resources at their 
disposal, which will enhance their ability to deploy them effectively (Cool & Dierkix, 1989; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).  
Based on the accumulation and deployment mechanisms of the RBV outlined above (Amit 
& Schoemaker, 1993; Augier & Teece, 2008; 2009; Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Teece, 2007), 
we argue that Team Manager TSHC will positively moderate the relationship between Team 
Member TSHC and team performance. 
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H2: The relationship between Team Member TSHC and team performance will be 
positively moderated by Team Manager TSHC. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
The professional team sports industry provides an excellent research site for investigating 
managerial phenomena (see: Kiedel, 1984; 1987; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986; Staw & Hoang, 
1995; Wright, Smart & McMahan, 1995), and specifically RBV and the various components of 
knowledge-based competitive advantage (Berman et al., 2002). The data-rich nature of the 
professional team sports industry enables researchers to easily identify and measure 
organizational performance, and the stock of experience of senior managers (i.e. head 
coaches) and other key employees (i.e. players) (Kahn, 2000). The extreme intensity and 
directness of competition in both the production and market processes suggests that 
competitive advantage may be difficult to create and sustain in professional team sports. 
Therefore, professional team sports provide a very rigorous context for testing our 
hypotheses on the crucial role of TSHC in driving organizational performance. 
Empirical context 
Our empirical context, the EPL, is the top professional football league in England, and 
arguably globally, as measured in terms of revenues, which stood at £3.26bn for the 2013-
2014 season, up from 29% during 2012/2013.1 The EPL is also an interesting context due to 
the highly flexible labour market for football players. The system of free agency, introduced 
following the landmark Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995, has led to all 
players having unrestricted mobility between teams when their current contract expires. The 
increased fluidity of the labour market, post Bosman, has contributed to a rapid rise in the 
                                                          
1 See: http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/annual-review-of-
football-finance-2015.html). Also, The recent television deal will increase EPL revenues from 
£3.08 for 2013/2014 to for £5.136bn for live Premier League TV rights for 2016-17 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31386483 accessed 02/02/2016). 
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wages as players are now better able to appropriate the full economic value associated with 
their HC. In effect, the players with more valuable stocks of HC command higher wages and 
so only the richest teams can afford to employ the best players. As a result, although large 
sums of money have been attracted to the EPL through media rights deals principally with 
satellite TV company, BSkyB, the money flows straight through the game to the players 
(Conn, 2005).2 
If professional sports leagues were characterised by financial determinism, with sporting 
outcomes entirely dictated by who paid the highest wages and attracted the players with the 
most valuable HC, then leagues would become totally predictable and lose the uncertainty 
of outcome that is such a crucial value driver (Rottenberg, 1956). Both anecdotal and 
statistical evidence suggests that the wage bill is not the only determinant of sporting 
success (Gerrard, 2006). In England, and also across the world, football is replete with 
examples of clubs that have become very successful with modest wage bills (e.g. Wimbledon 
FC; see: Crabtree, 1997) as well as clubs that have been spectacularly unsuccessful with very 
large wage bills (e.g. Leeds United FC; see: Rostron, 2004). 
Given the rapid rise in wages, it is becoming increasingly important that football 
organizations look for new ways to generate performance advantages as opposed to merely 
buying success. Interesting parallels have occurred in other sporting contexts, for example, 
the concept of sabermetrics (i.e. the application of data analytics to baseball) through 
“Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game” (Lewis, 2004). Citing how management used 
new performance metrics to seek out previously undervalued players and then shaped them 
                                                          
2 Alan Sugar (Tottenham's chairman from 1991-99) said many years ago at a Premier League 
meeting, “Gentlemen, it doesn't matter whether the television company gives us £3m or 
£33m, we'll piss it up the wall on wages.” 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/jan/10/portsmouth-wages-waste-of-money 
accessed 02/02/2016) 
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into a team, Lewis argues that although team success can be bought it can also be made. 
Wolfe, Wright and Smart (2006) suggest that Moneyball holds potentially interesting insights 
for scholars with an interest in competitive advantage. 
Sample and Data 
Our data consists of a panel of ten seasons, 1996/97 - 2005/06, of the EPL. Since 1995 the 
EPL has consisted of 20 teams each season, therefore, our sample comprises 200 
observations. Each team plays every other team home and away during the season to give a 
380-game total league schedule with each team playing 38 games. Teams are awarded 3 
points for a win, 1 point for a tied game and no points for a loss. The championship is 
awarded to the team with most points with goal difference and goals scored used if two or 
more teams are tied with the same points. Unlike the North American major leagues, there 
are no post-season domestic playoffs in the EPL although the final standings do determine 
entry to European tournaments in the following season. The bottom three teams are 
relegated to the Football League, the next tier in the pyramid structure, at the end of each 
season and replaced by three promoted teams. Over the sample period, 35 different teams 
played in the EPL. We contend that a merit-hierarchy sports league with promotion and 
relegation such as the EPL maximises innovation and effort incentives for both strong and 
weak teams and hence provides a better research site for investigating the impact of HC 
effects on team performance rather than leagues in which membership is fixed between 
seasons with no promotion-relegation system. 
All of our data is archival and is compiled from published sources (i.e. various editions of 
the Sky Sports Football Yearbook). Consistent with the practical criteria outlined by Godfrey 
and Hill (1995) and Berman et al. (2002) for a useful data set, we contend that our data 
source is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, the data provides a clear and objective 
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measure of the performance of a team. Second, data is provided on all of the players in a 
team, and also the larger squad. The squad sizes in our sample varied from 35-55. For every 
team and year data are available for every player. Third, the measures are consistent across 
all the time periods in our sample. Finally, the use of survey-based methods is infeasible for a 
data set that incorporates individual level data every year for nearly one thousand 
individuals, both players and managers, over a ten-year period. 
Dependent Variable 
Team Performance. Our measure of team performance is defined as the total number of 
points gained by the team during the season divided by the maximum attainable points. In 
the case of the EPL, the maximum attainable points per season during the sample period is 
114. In Guest’s (1997) terms, our measure is a “hard performance” measure, based on 
operational performance. We employ such a measure because it best reflects Coff’s (1999) 
notion of value creation, and is not subject to the problems of value appropriation that 
affect financial measures of performance. 
Model variables 
Both of our model variables are team-level constructs, which measure the extent to 
which team members and the team manager have developed human capital that is specific 
to the team. Consistent with Becker’s (1962 & 1975) definition, we follow the lead of 
Berman et al. (2002) and Huckman and Pisano (2006) in employing individual’s experience 
with a team as a means of constructing our measures of TSHC.  
Team Member TSHC. Following Berman et al. (2002) we measure Team Member TSHC as 
the weighted average of players' total number of career league experiences for their current 
team at the start of the season. We have weighted by current league starting appearances 
which is more appropriate in football with only a maximum of three player substitutions in a 
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game. We use the log transformation in order to improve the diagnostic properties of the 
estimated models. 
Team Manager TSHC. We measure Team Manager TSHC as the head coach's total number 
of games in charge at his current team (including previous spells) at the start of the current 
season using 1992, the year in which the EPL was formed, as the base year. Again we use the 
log transformation to yield the best diagnostic statistical estimates, specifically Ln(1 + Team 
Manager TSHC) to avoid the problem of Team Manager TSHC having a zero value when a 
new head coach has been appointed prior to the start of the new season. 
Team Member TSHC * Team Manager TSHC. In modelling the cross product we allow for 
the interaction between Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC. The inclusion of the 
cross product, along with the separate linear effects of Team Member TSHC and Team 
Manager TSHC, allows us to examine the possible performance effects of previously 
accumulated Team Member TSHC when a new team manager is appointed with zero 
previous experience with the team. We define the cross product as Team Member TSHC * [1 
+ Team Manager TSHC] using log transformations of the two components. 
Control variables 
General HC. The principal measure of General HC used in this study is defined as a club’s 
total annual wage costs divided by the annual league average to remove inflation effects. 
There are no reliable publicly available data on player wage costs in European professional 
team sports. A club’s total wage costs can be sourced from its audited company accounts 
and, given that player wages are the dominant component of total wage costs, it has 
generally been accepted that total wage costs provide a good proxy for player wage costs. 
Total wage costs have been used in the analysis of the relationship between team 
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performance and player quality in English professional football by, for example, Szymanski 
and Smith (1997) and Szymanski and Kuypers (1999).  
Age. In addition to total wage costs, we also include the weighted average of player age 
at the start of the season, weighted by current league starting appearances, as an additional 
measure of general HC. We also include the squared term, AgeSq, to allow for any quadratic 
effects, particularly the possibility that veteran players may receive a higher proportion of 
their remuneration for their off-the-field activities such as image rights which would imply 
that total wage costs may be less reliable as a proxy for the stock of general HC related to 
on-the-field sporting performance. 
Experience. We have also included an experience variable to further control for general 
HC. Experience is defined as the weighted average of the players’ total career league 
appearances for all professional football clubs, weighted by current league starting 
appearances. We use the log transformation to ensure the best diagnostic properties for the 
estimated models. As with the age variable and for similar reasons, we also allow for a 
quadratic effect by the inclusion of the squared term, ExperienceSq. The quadratic effects for 
both age and experience are found to be statistically significant in the final estimated 
models. There was no evidence of a statistically significant quadratic effect for total wage 
costs and so no squared term for this variable is included in the reported estimates. We also 
investigated the inclusion of various measures of the general HC of the head coach but all 
were found to be very highly insignificant statistically and were excluded from the final 
reported estimates. 
Dynamics. When undertaking sensitivity analysis on the robustness of the reported 
estimates, we consider the effects of using a dynamic specification to capture the time 
dependency of team performance arising from the effects of organizational capital. We 
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include two dynamic variables, Past Performance, defined as team performance in the 
previous season and Promoted, which is a binary variable taking the value of unity when a 
team is newly promoted from the lower division, and zero if the team played in the EPL in 
the previous season. 
Diversity.  In our sensitivity analysis we also include two additional control variables, Age 
Diversity and Experience Diversity to capture the possible effects on team performance 
arising from the heterogeneity of the general HC across team members. Both variables are 
measured by the respective standard deviation of player age and experience at the start of 
the current season weighted by current league starting appearances. 
Model Specification and Estimation 
In order to test our hypotheses we estimated four models starting with the linear and 
quadratic general HC and control variables in model 1, introducing Team Member TSHC in 
model 2, and the moderating effect of Team Manager TSHC on the relationship between 
Team Member TSHC and Team Performance in model 3. Finally, in model 4 we present a 
team-specific fixed effects analysis, utilizing the panel structure of our data set, to deal with 
the potential problems of residual autocorrelation and the mis-attribution of organizational 
capital effects to the shared experience of team members and the team manager. We 
employed model 4, our preferred model, to test our theoretical model. 
Residual autocorrelation can be the result of a dynamic mis-specification problem. In 
essence, we need to disentangle the causal relationship between the shared experience 
(which is the result of team stability) and performance. Simply stated, shared experience 
may lead to enhanced team performance which, in turn, may lead to greater shared 
experience as the management try to keep together a successful team. Interestingly, 
Berman et al. (2002) find the existence of residual autocorrelation but interpret this as an 
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estimation problem requiring the use of a different estimation method. An alternative 
interpretation of residual autocorrelation is as evidence of a dynamic mis-specification 
problem requiring a change in the model specification such as the inclusion of lagged effects 
(Hendry, 1980). We investigate the possibility of dynamic mis-specification, as detailed 
below, given that there are good theoretical grounds for expecting a feedback effect from 
team performance on shared experience.  
In addition to addressing the issue of residual autocorrelation, any model of team 
performance needs to acknowledge that knowledge does not only reside at the level of the 
individual, but may also be embedded in an organization. We suggest that such knowledge 
constitutes organizational capital, which is the knowledge that is preserved within 
organizations as individuals “come and go” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 285). Organizational capital 
includes codified experience residing within and utilized through databases, patents, 
manuals, structures, systems, and processes (Youndt, Subramaniam & Snell, 2004). 
Interestingly, issues of dynamic mis-specification and organizational capital effects are 
potentially related as organizational capital effects can create a dynamic interdependency in 
team performance across time periods. Specifically, if organizational capital changes slowly 
over time its impact on performance will be relatively constant over the short and medium 
term, thereby creating a tendency towards organizations replicating performance in the 
future periods. Hence, residual autocorrelation may be the consequence of a failure to 
include organizational capital as an explanatory variable. Utilizing the panel nature of our 
data set in model 4, estimating a fixed effects model, we can address the issues of dynamic 
mis-specification and organizational capital simultaneously. The fixed effects coefficients are 
a proxy for a team’s organizational capital, which vary between teams but are assumed to be 
relatively fixed from year to year for each team. Statistically the fixed-effects approach 
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yielded the better goodness-of-fit and diagnostic properties for our panel data as compared 
to a lagged variables approach. 
In order to establish the robustness of our fixed effects results in our preferred model 4, 
we also report four additional estimated models. Models 5 and 6 report the results when the 
time dependency of team performance is modelled using a dynamic specification. In model 5 
the two dynamic variables, Past Performance and Promoted, are included with no fixed 
effects. Model 6 includes both team-specific fixed effects and team-specific past 
performance effects using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. Model 7 
extends model 6 by including two additional controls, Age Diversity and Experience Diversity, 
to allow for the possible performance effects of the heterogeneity of general HC across team 
members. Finally model 8 considers the possibility that our TSHC variables are partially 
endogenously determined to the extent that members and managers of successful teams 
are more likely to be retained, creating the possibility of a feedback effect from team 
performance to TSHC. We report the instrumental-variable (IV) estimates for model 7 with 
general HC (i.e. wages) and the TSHC variables treated as endogenous.  
Four diagnostic tests are quoted for all of the estimated models – a normality test which 
can be indicative of outliers and general model miss-specification, White's test for 
heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey RESET test for general model mis-specification, and the AR(1) 
test for first-order residual autocorrelation (adjusted for the panel structure of the data). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for selected variables. The 
descriptive statistics for the experience and TSHC variables are reported without the log 
transformation. The simple correlation coefficients show that general HC measured by 
relative wage costs has the highest degree of linear association with team performance, 
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reflecting the strength of financial determinism in English professional football. This 
reinforces the belief that the players’ labour market is highly efficient in reflecting general 
HC in player wage valuations and, as a consequence, validates the use of relative wage costs 
as the principal means of controlling for general HC effects. Both team member TSHC and 
manager TSHC are positively related correlated with team performance, at .43 and .39 
respectively. It should be noted that the correlation coefficient indicates a potential 
multicollinearity problem with high correlation between the age and experience variables. 
However, this multicollinearity has limited impact on our results since age and experience 
are control variables and not a central focus of this study. In any case the estimated 
coefficients for these variables show a reasonable degree of stability and are statistically 
significant in most of the estimated models. The data set includes a well-known “outlier”, Sir 
Alex Ferguson, the long-serving head coach of Manchester United, the most successful team 
in the EPL. The empirical results change little, however, when Sir Alex Ferguson is excluded 
from the sample. Indeed the impact of both Team Manager TSHC and the cross product 
increases slightly in absolute terms. If anything Ferguson’s managerial longevity and success 
masks the impact on performance of managers with much shorter periods of tenure. 
-- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
OLS regression results are reported in Table 2 – models 1 to 3. Model 1 shows that all the 
General HC variables are statistically significant at the 1% level and jointly explain 63.3% of 
the variation in Team Performance. The quadratic effects for both Age and Experience are 
statistically significant. Age is found to have an inverted U-shaped relationship with Team 
Performance with the marginal effect of an increased average age in the team diminishing 
and then becoming negative. This is consistent with the suggestion that total wage costs 
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may be less reflective of on-the-field sporting ability for older players. The Experience effect 
exhibits a U-shaped relationship with Team Performance.  
-- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
 
Model 2 introduces Team Member TSHC, which has a significant positive impact on Team 
Performance, supporting H1. In addition, and for the purpose of robustness, we modelled 
Team Member TSHC in quadratic form to test for the potential that its performance benefits 
would diminish with cumulative experience (Wright 1936; Dutton & Thomas 1984; Adler, 
1990; Argote et al. 1990). We found no evidence that this was the case, the Team Member 
TSHC quadratic term being highly insignificant.  
In model 3 we include the moderating effect of Team Manager TSHC on the relationship 
between Team Member TSHC and Team Performance. The inclusion of the cross product 
term renders the effects of Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC negative, and the 
cross product term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, supporting H2. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of the interaction term allows for the possibility of the negative 
effects on Team Performance caused by manager/employee succession that reduces Team 
Member TSHC and/or Team Manager TSHC to low levels. In all three estimated models the 
AR(1) diagnostic test statistic is statistically significant indicating the presence of residual 
autocorrelation. 
Model 4, our preferred model, employs team-specific fixed effects to deal with the 
related problems of residual autocorrelation and the potential effect of organizational 
capital (which may consist of practices such as talent management programmes), which is 
accomplished as the AR(1) diagnostic test statistic becomes statistically insignificant. The 
estimated fixed effects are reported in Table 3. In model 4, team member TSHC and 
manager TSHC both have negative effects and the cross product has a positive effect and is 
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dominant. At mean values of Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC the marginal 
impacts are both positive. Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC only have negative 
impacts overall (including the cross product effect) when their values are low. Specifically 
Team Member TSHC has a negative effect overall only when Team Manager TSHC is less than 
79.2 (around two playing seasons); Team Manager TSHC only has a negative impact overall 
when Team Member TSHC is less than 38.1. For analytical clarity we graphically represent 
the moderating relationship in Figure 1, showing the effect of Team Manager TSHC on the 
overall marginal impact of Team Member TSHC (i.e. both the linear and cross-product 
effects) at three different levels of Team Member TSHC: low (= 20), moderate (= 65), and 
high (= 165). Figure 1 shows that the moderating effect of Team Manager TSHC is greatest at 
low levels of Team Member TSHC. At high levels of Team Member TSHC there is little 
variation on the marginal impact of Team Member TSHC from the moderating effect of Team 
Manager TSHC. 
-- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
-- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
In Table 4 we report the impact on league points of a two standard deviation increase in 
all of the general and team-specific HC variables as presented in model 4. The impact of a 
two standard deviation increase in wage costs is 9.1 points, the equivalent of three 
additional wins. The result slightly exaggerates the impact of General HC on (sporting) 
performance given that, as discussed above, wage costs include remuneration for image 
rights (i.e. non-sporting performance) and hence are likely to overstate the sporting 
contribution of older, more experienced and better known players. After correcting for the 
effects of age and experience the overall impact of the increase in general HC is 7.2 points 
which represents 71.9% of the total impact of 9.9 points. The TSHC variables contribute 2.8 
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points (28.1%) to the total impact but this is a net contribution. The positive impact of the 
cross product is 16.4 points, more than twice the impact of general HC. 
-- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
In Table 5 we report the results of the sensitivity analysis of our basic TSHC model of team 
performance. In model 5 fixed effects are replaced by the two dynamic variables, which are 
both statistically significant and also resolve the residual autocorrelation problem. 
Importantly, there is very little impact on the estimated coefficients for the TSHC variables 
when switching from a fixed-effects specification in model 4 to the dynamic specification in 
model 5. In model 6 we allow for team-specific dynamics as well as team-specific fixed 
effects. In this specification there is no need to separately allow for promotion effects, which 
are now highly insignificant and fully captured by the team-specific dynamics. Again using a 
dynamic specification resolves the residual autocorrelation problem and, crucially, has very 
little impact on the magnitude of the TSHC effects. Model 7 extends model 6 by including 
two additional diversity variables as controls. Age Diversity has a positive and significant 
effect on Team Performance whereas Experience Diversity has a negative but insignificant 
effect. Controlling for diversity effects leads to a greater absolute effect on Team 
Performance from both General HC and TSHC compared to model 6 while reducing the 
absolute linear and quadratic effects of average experience. In addition, the two diversity 
variables jointly resolve the residual non-normality problem that arose in model 6 from the 
use of team-specific dynamics. This specification provides some insight into the trade-off 
faced when new team members are introduced whose General HC is towards the extremes 
in the team particularly as regards age. New team members, either young players or 
veterans, may compensate for the negative performance effects of lowering Team Member 
TSHC by enhancing performance through a positive effect of greater team diversity. 
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-- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
Model 8 reports the results from using IV estimation to control for the possible 
endogeneity of the TSHC effects, with instruments constructed that include the remaining 
data collected on teams but not otherwise used in the reported models (specifically player 
career scoring rates and national team appearances, both levels and heterogeneity, 
supplemented by playing-season binary variables). Two key results emerge from model 8. 
First, the estimated effect of the control variable, general HC as measured by wage costs, is 
substantially reduced by more than tenfold after allowing for endogeneity. Second, and 
crucially, allowing for endogeneity using IV estimation leads to only small absolute effects on 
all three TSHC variables. Although we recognise the limitations of our IV estimates due to 
data constraints, they do nevertheless provide a clear indication that the direct effects of 
TSHC on team performance remain largely unaffected after eliminating any bias in the OLS 
estimates arising from dampening feedback effects. In contrast, the magnitude of the direct 
effect of team expenditure on General HC is progressively reduced, ultimately being 
rendered statistically insignificant in model 8 when allowing for dynamic interdependencies 
and possible endogeneity effects. The finding suggests that there is a strong feedback from 
team performance to wage expenditure via performance-sensitive revenues, such that high-
spending teams that perform well are able to generate high revenues to maintain their high 
wage expenditures. However, this feedback process does not necessarily have the same 
impact on TSHC since high wage budgets allow teams to have a choice between retaining the 
General HC of their existing team or acquiring additional new General HC in the marketplace, 
with very different implications for the team’s stock of TSHC. 
In sum, the sensitivity analysis reported in Table 5 provides reassurance that the 
estimated TSHC effects are robust to alternative modelling solutions to: (i) the structure of 
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the time dependency of performance; (ii) the possible impact of General HC heterogeneity 
within teams; and (iii) the potential endogeneity of TSHC due to current team performance 
impacting on future retention and recruitment decisions for both team members and 
managers. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have developed and tested a model of two different dimensions of TSHC: 
team member and team manager. Drawing on data from a professional team sport, our 
findings indicate that Team manager TSHC positively moderates the relationship between 
Team Member TSHC and Team Performance. We believe that our work has important 
implications for scholars of the RBV and HC in terms of the potential sources of firm-specific 
competitive advantage. 
Our findings attest to the importance of managerial tenure in both shaping and deploying 
the HC at their disposal. Employing the cross product we are able to demonstrate that the 
performance advantages that that stem from Team Member TSHC are contingent on the 
presence of Team Manager TSHC, which has important implications for managerial tenure. 
Specifically, our findings highlight that low levels of managerial tenure, which are associated 
with high managerial turnover, will have a negative effect on the relationship between Team 
Member TSHC and Team Performance. Hence, there is a real and significant performance 
implication to changing a manager, as reflected by the negative direct effects for Team 
Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC when the cross product term is included. The 
negative effects arguably capture the impact of the disruption associated with changing a 
manager and/or high team member turnover.   
Our findings have important implications for our understanding of how resources are 
developed, and their relationship with performance. To date the resource-performance 
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relationship has occupied a central position in RBV research (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 
1999). However, recent meta-analyses of empirical studies indicate that evidence for this 
relationship is less than conclusive (Barney & Arikan, 2001; Crook, Ketchen, Combs & Todd, 
2008; Newbert, 2007). We suggest that the equivocal nature of results may be due to 
previous studies not identifying the key resources that drive performance, i.e. the variables 
employed are analytically convenient but are not the most salient ones (Lockett et al., 2009). 
Consistent with RBV scholars, who have focused on capability development, we contend 
that managers play a key role in the process of capability development and deployment 
(Augier & Teece, 2008, 2009; Sirmon et al., 2007; Teece, 2007). As such, managers should be 
viewed as a key resource of the firm, and one that may enable the firm to develop 
performance advantages.  
In addition, our findings have important implications for the management of teams and 
the development of HC that may lead to sustainable competitive advantage. In the 
professional sports industries, as well as commerce in general, organizations compete for 
the best talent. Where flexible labour markets exist, organizations will merely compete with 
one another and drive up the wages for workers, particularly when workers’ skills are largely 
non-firm specific. In Coff’s (1999) terms, the value created by workers through their general 
HC is likely to be appropriated by workers through wage bargaining over time. TSHC, in 
contrast, is more amenable to being appropriated by the firm, and may be viewed as an 
important source of sustainable competitive advantage because workers find it difficult to 
appropriate the returns to their TSHC (Coff, 1999; Mortensen, 1988a & 1988b; Rosen, 1988). 
As highlighted in the results section, we find that the performance impact from a two 
standard deviation shift in TSHC is greater, than that of General HC, where an organization 
has high Team Member TSHC and Team Manager TSHC. We suggest, therefore, that TSHC 
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may be an important concept for scholars of the RBV, as it may hold the promise for 
organizations to create sustainable performance differences, which they may appropriate to 
enhance their financial performance. 
From a practitioner perspective, our work suggests that managers need considerable time 
before they can become effective in their new role; the positive effect of Team Manager 
TSHC on the relationship between Team Member TSHC and Team Performance occurring, on 
average, after two years of managerial tenure. Paradoxically, many EPL football 
organizations are not prepared to wait that long, with the average tenure of managers 
falling below 18 months in recent seasons (League Managers Association, 2010). 
Furthermore, the benefits of managerial tenure may be more limited when they join a team 
with high levels of Team Member TSHC, see Figure 1. We suggest that high levels of Team 
Member TSHC developed under a previous manager may lead to team members being more 
resistant to the adoption of new practices introduced by the new manager. 
In addition to managerial tenure, our work raises important practitioner issues in relation 
to the turnover of personnel in a team. Replacing some team members and/or the manager 
may be one component of a strategy to improve performance in a failing work group, but it 
is no guarantee of future success. Any gain through new recruitment in terms of the stock of 
General HC within the work group will be, at least in part, offset by the reduction in the stock 
of TSHC and the inevitably difficulties in assimilating new members into the work group. 
Team turnover, therefore, should be viewed as a double-edged sword, particularly for high 
performing teams.  
In terms of future research, we feel that there is a need for more work to examine the 
functioning of teams may influence the performance effects of the TSHC accumulated over 
time. First, we think it important to further examine the how the diversity within a team, 
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which will shape the context in which the team members interact with one another through 
different forms of conflict (affective and cognitive), may affect the relationship between 
TSHC and performance. Our results are indicative of a complex trade-off between General 
HC and TSHC, particularly when considering replacing team members (which reduces Team 
Member TSHC) and bringing in either young or veteran players who significantly increase the 
overall heterogeneity of the team’s General HC, which can be performance-enhancing. 
Second, in considering how teams function, we suggest that team sports offers an 
interesting window into the use of HRM practices (such as talent management systems) and 
how they may influence the accumulation and deployment of HC. Building on the work of 
Wright et al. (1995), scholars may wish to examine how different configurations of HRM 
practices may lead to the creation of team-specific HC, and its effects on performance.  
Third, we feel that more work needs to be done to consider what may be an “optimal” 
level of team turnover, and how this may be influenced by the dynamics of a competitive 
environment. Given the highly fluid labour market (managers and players), and extreme 
competitive nature of the EPL, we wonder whether or not sufficient team stability can be 
achieved in order to drive success on the basis of TSHC. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix calculated before log transformation applied to experience and TSHC variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Max 
Value 
Min 
Value 
Mean S.D. Coefficient 
of Variation 
Correlation Coefficient 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Team Performance (1) 0.83 0.13 0.46 0.13 0.29 1.00      
General HC(2) 2.83 0.29 1.00 0.48 0.48 0.78 1.00     
Age (3) 30.87 22.67 26.97 1.24 0.05 -0.15 -0.23 1.00    
Experience (4) 330.30 125.30 213.40 35.70 0.17 0.02 -0.05 0.81 1.00   
Team Member TSHC (5) 167.80 20.40 65.90 25.12 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.09 0.31 1.00  
Team Manager TSHC (6) 506.00 0.00 100.95 91.80 0.91 0.39 0.33 -0.04 0.07 0.42 1.00 
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TABLE 2 
OLS regression analysis of Team member TSHC, Team Manager TSHC and Team 
Performance 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Team Performance 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Constant 
 
 
General HC 
 
 
Age 
 
 
AgeSq 
 
 
Experience 
 
 
ExperienceSq 
 
 
Team Member TSHC 
 
 
Team Manager TSHC 
 
 
Team Member TSHC * 
Team Manager TSHC 
 
7.82816* 
(4.027) 
 
0.211712*** 
(0.01273) 
 
0.397902*** 
(0.1485) 
 
-0.007591*** 
(0.002801) 
 
-4.91537*** 
(1.759) 
 
0.471682*** 
(0.1667) 
7.28415* 
(4.002) 
 
0.202698*** 
(0.01335) 
 
0.348685** 
(0.1492) 
 
-0.006618** 
(0.002817) 
 
-4.48882** 
(1.757) 
 
0.427628** 
(0.1667) 
 
0.0368178** 
(0.01777) 
8.46797 
(3.915) 
 
0.193762*** 
(0.01340) 
 
0.347184** 
(0.145) 
 
-0.006546** 
(0.002745 
 
-4.78194*** 
(1.715 
 
0.453988**** 
(0.1627 
 
-0.0620405 
(0.04013) 
 
-.0867747** 
(0.03760) 
 
0.0228233** 
(0.009015) 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
0.0831337** 
(0.03262) 
 
0.306916* 
(0.1595) 
 
-0.006043** 
(0.003021 
 
-3.16645 
(2.057) 
 
0.308645 
(0.1950) 
 
-0.0840025* 
(0.04559) 
 
-0.0699237 
(0.04413) 
 
0.0192120* 
(0.01074) 
Goodness of fit 
s 
R2 
F 
 
0.08037 
0.63286 
66.88*** 
 
0.07970 
0.64084 
57.39*** 
 
0.07766 
0.66249 
46.86*** 
 
0.07455 
0.74439 
10.09*** 
Diagnostics 
Normality 
Hetero 
RESET 
AR(1) 
 
1.3188 
1.1246 
0.1618 
2.306** 
 
2.0405 
1.0316 
0.0026 
2.108** 
 
2.1153 
1.2044 
0.1466 
1.895* 
 
1.2052 
1.2875 
0.6568 
0.512 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level; 
standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed test). s = standard error of regression; F = 
test of overall significance of regression (F one-tailed test); White test for 
heteroskedasticity (F one-tailed test); RESET test for specification errors (F one-tailed 
test); AR(1) test for autoregressive errors in panel data (F one-tailed test). 
  33 
 
TABLE 3 
Estimated Fixed Effects (Model 4) 
 
Team Fixed Effect Ranking 
Arsenal 5.04755 1 
Chelsea 5.01315 2 
Man Utd 5.01212 3 
Liverpool 4.97846 4 
Leeds Utd 4.92930 5 
   
Wimbledon 4.92418 6 
Aston Villa 4.91993 7 
Southampton 4.91106 8 
Newcastle 4.91041 9 
Bolton 4.90222 10 
   
Blackburn 4.90058 11 
Ipswich 4.90055 12 
West Ham 4.89233 13 
Fulham 4.88946 14 
Tottenham 4.88623 15 
   
Birmingham 4.88356 16 
Sheffield Wed 4.88323 17 
Leicester 4.88282 18 
Middlesboro 4.88214 19 
Everton 4.87135 20 
   
Wigan Ath 4.87047 21 
Man City  4.85695 22 
Derby Co 4.85653 23 
Charlton 4.85419 24 
Portsmouth 4.84766 25 
   
Coventry 4.84658 26 
Barnsley 4.80867 27 
Bradford 4.80613 28 
Sunderland 4.79862 29 
Wolves 4.77513 30 
   
Crystal Palace 4.77218 31 
Norwich 4.76669 32 
WBA 4.75889 33 
Nottingham Forest 4.75140 34 
Watford 4.71038 35 
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FIGURE 1 
The moderating effect of Manager TSHC on the relationship between Team 
Member TSHC and team performance 
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TABLE 4 
Estimated Points Impact of a Two Standard Deviation 
in the Determinants of Team Performance 
 
 Points Impact of 
Two Standard 
Deviation Increase 
General HC +9.098 
Other General HC Controls -1.946 
Team Member TSHC -5.428 
Team Manager TSHC -8.210 
Team Member TSHC * Team Manager TSHC +16.428 
Total +9.943 
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TABLE 5 
Sensitivity Analysis of the Basic TSHC Model of Team Performance 
 
Dependent Variable: 
TEAM PERFORMANCE 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 
 
 
General HC 
 
 
Age 
 
 
AgeSq 
 
 
Experience 
 
 
ExperienceSq 
 
 
Team Member TSHC 
 
 
Team Manager TSHC 
 
 
Team Member TSHC * 
Team Manager TSHC 
 
Past Performance 
 
 
Promoted 
 
 
Age Diversity 
 
 
Experience Diversity 
 
 
8.07738** 
(3.207) 
 
0.159454*** 
(0.01832) 
 
0.335237*** 
(0.1043) 
 
-0.006327*** 
(0.001975) 
 
-4.58268*** 
(1.280) 
 
0.435573*** 
(0.1225) 
 
-0.0685591* 
(0.03516) 
 
-0.0833125*** 
(0.02688) 
 
0.0213962*** 
(0.006310) 
 
0.187685* 
(0.1035) 
 
-0.0593612** 
(0.03006) 
Team-Specific 
 
 
0.038782 
(0.04363) 
 
0.518752*** 
(0.1155) 
 
-0.010004*** 
(0.002251) 
 
-4.03749** 
(1.172) 
 
0.389337** 
(0.1561) 
 
-0.0839692** 
(0.03995) 
 
-0.0712257** 
(0.03559) 
 
0.0198131** 
(0.008480) 
 
Team-Specific 
 
 
Team-Specific 
 
 
0.067789* 
(0.03624) 
 
0.506741*** 
(0.1140) 
 
-0.009827*** 
(0.002236) 
 
-2.69130** 
(1.200) 
 
0.265103** 
(0.1123) 
 
-0.127782*** 
(0.03543) 
 
-0.0849367** 
(0.03436) 
 
0.0235141*** 
(0.008451) 
 
Team-Specific 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0522372*** 
(0.009383) 
 
-0.00132094 
(0.001048) 
Team-Specific 
 
 
0.0048812 
(0.1988) 
 
0.785007** 
(0.3174) 
 
-0.0153275** 
(0.006381) 
 
-6.16286* 
(3.300) 
 
0.602171* 
(0.3201) 
 
-0.0766208 
(0.2956) 
 
-0.0758929 
(0.3244) 
 
0.0268363 
(0.07849) 
 
Team-Specific 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0525390*** 
(0.01151) 
 
-0.00188851** 
(0.0008666) 
Goodness of fit 
s 
R2 
 
0.07705 
0.67128 
 
0.07348 
0.79910 
 
0.06324 
0.85364 
 
0.07390 
0.79999 
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F 38.60*** 7.02*** 9.85*** 6.36*** 
Diagnostics 
Normality 
Hetero 
RESET 
AR(1) 
 
2.0930 
0.7976 
0.0736 
1.393 
 
6.4361** 
0.1892 
0.1184 
0.946 
 
3.2322 
0.1124 
1.4363 
0.939 
 
3.2585 
0.1607 
n/a 
n/a 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level; 
standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed test). s = standard error of regression; F = 
test of overall significance of regression (F one-tailed test); White test for 
heteroscedasticity (F one-tailed test); RESET test for specification errors (F one-tailed 
test); AR(1) test for autoregressive errors in panel data (F one-tailed test). 
 
 
